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Seek justice. Love peace.
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Scope
Nepal is at a historical junction, the recent victory of the second People’s
Movement garnering a plethora of democratic reforms. Since the end of April, King
Gyanendra has reinstated the House of Representatives, which then declared its
supremacy and dramatically curtailed the king’s powers. Nepal has been declared a
secular state; the Royal Nepal Army has been transformed the Nepali Army; a ceasefire
has been created between the army and the Maoists - who are also participating in peace
talks; and the seven-party alliance and the Maoists held a summit at which they agreed to
frame an interim statute, form an interim government and declare a date for elections to a
constituent assembly.
The situation in Nepal is improving, but this paper (which serves as a survey of
the widespread human rights violations in Nepal) chooses to largely focus on the preApril situation: before the People’s Movement succeeded, before there was so much
room for optimism. So for the next thirty pages there is no ceasefire, the RNA is still the
RNA, and the soldiers are still Gyanendra’s. While learning from this recent history, one
should hope for the day when discussions of such violence are history themselves.

Introduction
When Nepal is mentioned for something besides yetis or Mt. Everest, one hopes
that it is for something more cheerful than becoming good at violating human rights. But
many people in Nepal are violating human rights, their recent history providing ample
opportunities for such violations to occur. Nepal is becoming known for its autocratic
king, who is fighting a fierce and abusive Maoist insurgency and simultaneously
repressing the people. Nearly 12,000 people have died in the crossfire of the conflict;
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Maoists rule the countryside through extortion and looting and supply their army with the
abducted and children; thousands have been disappeared, killed, arrested, and tortured
either on suspicion of involvement with the Maoists or as punishment for liberal political
activity. Protestors, as well as political leaders, journalists and human rights workers are
arrested and harassed. The heavy hand of the autocratic state met these progressive
activists, and the more violent Maobaadi (a term I use interchangeably with Maoist) with
brutality and rampant violations of human rights. To understand how the interactions
between one state and two movements for social change (one armed, one unarmed) create
a breeding ground for human rights violations it is necessary to investigate the multiple
factors that contribute, including the political and social history that brought the Maoists
to this point, the effect of globalization, the nature of the king and the impact of military
tactics. Understanding the current human rights status of Nepal requires recognizing four
rounds of human rights violations, and debating whether other forces will be strong
enough, whether other paths of action will be effective enough to halt the cycle of abuses.

Human Rights and Nepal
Nepal was admitted to the United Nation on December 14, 1955 and has since
become party to human rights treaties about economic, social and cultural rights,
women’s rights, civil and political rights, discrimination, children, and torture.
Additionally, its constitution provides a framework for the protection of human rights.
The Declaration of Human Rights, considered the foundation of human rights theory and
legislation, maintains that every person has the right to life, liberty, and security of
person; that no person shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading
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treatment or punishment nor to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile; and that each person,
among other rights, is guaranteed the right to a fair trial. And yet Nepal categorically
ignores these obligations, these guides to decency.

The People’s War
Political History
The many communist political parties of Nepal have a long and interwoven
history, one that is rife with personal animosities and power struggles. Man Mohan
Adhikari, who led the workers at the 1947 strike at the Biratnagar jute and cloth mill in
Eastern Nepal, and former Nepali Congress member Pushpa Lal originally founded the
Communist Party of Nepal (CPN) in 1949. But by 1951 Adhikari had replaced Lal as
general secretary of the party, a shift that started “‘the beginning of the never-ending
leadership struggle within the party’ and a bane that was to affect all factions that
branched out of the main party.” 1 Affect them it did, and after much complicated factional
forming and reforming, in 1990, Nepal saw the establishment of CPN (Unity
Center)/United People’s Front Nepal (UPFN) - a party Prachanda, then general secretary
of CPN Mashal, had helped create when he combined forces with CPN Masal and other
radical factions. Baburam Bhattarai, who now serves (behind Prachanda) as the second
most important figurehead of the Maoists, was chosen to lead this grouping. 2
The Unity Center/(UPFN) made itself known as a radical party, leading protests
against the government that were mildly supported by the dominant communist party
CPN (United Marxist-Leninist) and violently suppressed by the Congress government. In

1
2

Thapa, Deepak. A Kingdom Under Siege Kathmandu: the printhouse. 2003. 22.
Thapa, 35.
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1994 the Unity Center split into two groups, one led by Nirmal Lama and one led by
Prachanda - whose party advocated “‘a clear cut political line of protracted people’s war
for carrying out the New Democratic revolution in the country with a Marxist-LeninistMaoist ideological perspective.’” 3 A resolution calling for this New Democratic
revolution had been passed by the Unity Center in 1991, and was the cause of the
subsequent break up of the party. Despite this professed policy, arms were not taken up
immediately. Instead, after the first People’s Movement in 1990, Bhattarai’s wing of the
UPFN, allied with Prachanda, approached the Election Commission in an attempt to
remain within the realm of normal politics. However, the Election Commission denied
recognition to the party, an exclusion that “deprived the Maoists of the opportunity to
engage in the democratic governance of the country” 4 and thus pushed them out of the
mainstream by providing motivation for them to abandon the multiparty system in favor
of armed revolt from the underground. They began their first attacks on February 13,
1996, four days before the deadline for the government’s reaction to the set of 40
demands that had been delivered by Bhattarai to Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba.
Root Causes
The exclusion from democratic politics in 1990 did not alone create the People’s
War, for in the newly opened political forum of democracy, Nepal’s aggrieved
populations saw the space in which they should have been able to articulate their
grievances. Instead, their lack of political capital and their comparatively scarce presence
in the government transformed them into a fertile soil in which the Maoist revolt could
take root.
3

Thapa, 43.
Lawoti, Mahendra. Towards a Democratic Nepal: Inclusive Political Institutions for a Multicultural
Society. New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2005. 41
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The Maoists’ ideological platform integrates demands for a new constitution,
drinking water, electricity, employment and education for all, a secular state, the freedom
to enjoy fundamental rights of expression and press, land reform and the cessation of
discrimination and exploitation against women, ethnic minorities, and ‘untouchables’.
Indeed, those who began to (and still do) support the Maobaadi in their revolution are the
ones who would be helped by the realization of those demands, the ones who lack enough
power under normal governmental conditions to effect that change themselves. They are
people in the 82.5% of the population that live on less than two dollars a day, or in the
rural areas that receive even less than their urban counterparts of the measly 1.4% of
GDP that Nepal spends on health. 5 According to the UNDP’s 2003 Human Development
Report, Nepal’s annual GDP (in US billions) was 5.9, its GDP per capita was 237 US
dollars, and its growth rates for each were 2.1 and 2.2, respectively. 6 An elite exists in
Nepal, but the country is very poor, and relatively unrepresentative in its governance,
meaning that the poor of Nepal are in most dire situations. Little debate remains about
the ability of discrimination and disparity to engender political violence and in a country
practically characterized by its inequality, the Maoists’ ideas are just radical enough to
entice those who have no hope other than radicalism.
British scholar Andrew Nickson wrote in 1992 that “the future prospects of
Maoism in Nepal will . . .depend largely on the extent to which the newly elected Nepali
Congress government addresses the historic neglect and discrimination of the small rural

5

UNDP, Human Development Report 2005:
http://www.undp.org.np/publication/html/hdr2005/HDR05_HDI.pdf
6
UNDP, Human Development Report 2003: http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/countries.cfm?c=NPL
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communities which still make up the overwhelming bulk of the population.” 7 But the
Nepali Congress failed to deal with these issues in the 1990s, just as King Gyanendra has
failed since taking power. Despite masses of development funds that NGOs and INGOs
pour into Nepal, “most development efforts continue to be far short of expectations and
much of the development funding went into the pockets of the corrupt, rather than to
those for whom it was intended. Failure to bring economic benefits and social change to
disadvantaged or ‘excluded’ groups and to remote or disenfranchised areas brought great
disillusionment.” 8 Nepal not only saw great disparities between the five development
regions (which stretch over the country north to south) and the three main ecological
regions (the Himals, the Hills and the Tarai), but also saw identities, which are closely
tied to those regions, become politicized. That was just what the Maoists needed because
the newly politicized are just who the Maoists needed. “The insurgency afflicting Nepal
does not constitute an overnight crisis, but is the consequence of years of multiple
deprivation of whole regions, communities, ethnic groups, and social classes.” 9
The First Round: Human Rights Violations as Causes of Maoist Insurgency
Frustrated by the inabilities of the current political system to support the reforms
the Maoists advocated, and encouraged by the failures of the state to protect and
prioritize the people’s human rights, the Maoists launched their People’s War in 1996,
with their army People’s Liberation Army (PLA), marking that “the movement was no
longer a temporary phenomenon without social base but had (and has) roots deep in the
country’s social and economic order, and is a by-product of Nepal’s unsuccessful
7

Thapa, Deepak. “The Maobadi of Nepal” State of Nepal Kanak Mani Dixit and Shastri Ramachandaran,
Eds. Lalitpur: Himal Books, 2002, 86
8
Friedman, Lindsay. Conflict in Nepal. Kathmandu: Shtrii Shakti. 2005. 17
9
Aditya, Anand. “Human Rights in the Nineties: Lessons from a Decade of Democratization and
Development” in Conflict, Human Rights & Peace: Challenges Before Nepal Bipin Adhikari, Ed.
Kathmandu: National Human Rights Commission, 2003. 65
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development endeavors.” 10 Indeed, the ‘unsuccessful development endeavors’ were not
merely singular failures, but a historical stream of (continuing) neglect and oversight that
directly inhibits the majority of Nepalis from realizing and enjoying the full scope and
extent of their human rights.
As evidenced by the conflict, it is difficult to argue that Nepal is successfully
implementing (or ever tried to) development programs that elevate human rights as the
main targets of strengthening or as guiding principles and tools for measurement, as is
advanced by a human-rights based approach to development. People are excluded and
discriminated against and benefits reach a select few and there is not enough being done
in the name of common welfare or mass benefit. Too many people are still living without
full realization of their human rights and too many people are dying for that very reason.
But many do realize that they are being barred from such human rights
realizations. They recognize that their state is not allowing then to enjoy their basic
human rights, including the right to development, as well as their economic, social and
cultural rights. The state is also failing to live up to their obligation of providing
protection from other aggressive actors (like strong economic interests, or insurgents). 11
And so, for the past decade, thousands have been fighting a system that seems not
to care about them, that never seems to have cared. As Douglas writes, “The Maoist
insurgency was born in the poverty of rural Nepal.” 12 In the end, Nepal has no one but
herself, and the wider global disparity of globalization, to blame for a rebellion that found
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Thapa, Kingdom Under Siege, 55.
Eide, Asbjorn. "The Right to Development and the Duty of States to Enforce Economic, Social and
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its inspiration and resources in the ruin of the ‘undeveloped,’ in the consciousness of the
downtrodden.
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A Global Phenomenon: Globalization’s New Wars
As the most deadly and prolonged civil conflict in Nepal, the People’s War is a
new phenomenon for the small country. Such is not true for many regions of the world,
where insurgencies taking hold in the absence of equality and economic advancement
have a longer history. Despite the fact that intrastate war is neither uncommon nor
ahistorical, there is a new type of warfare - exemplified by the Maoist revolution - that is
becoming the norm, even as these “new wars” 13 (as Mary Kaldor calls them) generally
occur in countries and regions where lack of economic and political power on the world
stage shields them from global concern. War is happening in ways which conflict with
our collective conception of it as something like the state-interest motivated wars of the
19th and 20th centuries. “As the centralized, territorialized modern state gives way to new
types of polity emerging out of new global processes, so war, as we presently conceive it,
is becoming an anachronism.” 14 “Today the armed forced of states are being challenged,
in many cases successfully, by the fighters of non-state forces, who are bound by none of
the norms of conventional war and who operate in a way that neutralizes a large
percentage of the expensive and sophisticated equipment and armaments of state
forces.” 15 The conditions that facilitate these types of war and the ways of fighting (and
paying for) them are new patterns of warfare and new manifestations of globalization.
The Path to New Wars
As modern states grew during the 19th century, they garnered a “monopolization
of legitimate violence” 16 and created a system in which war was only waged when in the

13

Kaldor, Mary. New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in the Global Era. Palo Alto:
Stanford University Press, 2000. 69
14
Kaldor, 15.
15
Cowan, Sam. “Nepal’s Two Wars” Himal South Asian, ed. Kanak Mani Dixit, March-April 2006, 32
16
Kaldor, 17
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interest of the state. War became a political act and a socially accepted endeavor that
formed clear distinctions between the military and the civilian, the economic and the
political. The 20th century, however, saw the evolution of total wars, which began to
breakdown those delineations. And in the face of new levels of destruction and less
patriotic duty or heroic status in imagined wars like the Cold War or unsuccessful wars
like Vietnam, the legitimacy of state-interest wars was called into question. In theory
then, the only justifiable wars today are those fought for self-defense or with sanction of
the international community. 17 In reality, issues of legitimacy and justice struggle to
make any real impact on the terror of war, with any success usually only affecting
interstate wars. Instead, globalization is creating what Friedman calls “the great age of
civil wars . . . between those who benefit from this new system and those who feel left
behind by it.” 18 So war continues, with globalization’s ability to exasperate disparities
and instability creating all the conditions and justifications the new warriors need.
The People’s War as a New War
Footholds and Foot Soldiers
Economic and political disparities, both between different types of workers and
between different regions, are perhaps one of the most apparent impacts of globalization,
one of the most important conditions for new wars and one of the most rousing causes of
the People’s War, as discussed above. Those able to market financial or technological
skills are better equipped than the traditional skilled laborers of the working class.
Industrialized areas, like Kathmandu, are quickly surpassing rural areas, like the rest of
Nepal, in terms of wealth, resources and importance. “Everywhere, boundaries are being
drawn between protected and prosperous global enclaves and the anarchic chaotic
poverty-stricken area beyond.” 19 It is within this realm of the globally excluded that new
17

Kaldor, 27
Friedman, Thomas. The Lexus and the Olive Tree. New York: First Anchor Books, 2000. 212.
19
Kaldor, 75
18
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wars find their footholds and it is within the realm of the nationally excluded that
intrastate new wars find their soldiers and their (often coerced) supporters.
Finding a Common Identity
The Maoist reliance on identity politics in these excluded areas is another
example of how the rebellion meets new war criteria. As regions become more
segmented and inequalities exaggerated, new identities are formed or embraced, and the
politics that surround those identities compose the foundation of the new wars.
Kaldor maintains that these identities tend to be of the more traditional sort –
national, tribal, religious. In the early stages of the Maoist struggle, support grew in the
mid-western hills and among the Kham Magars, the region’s inhabitants, whose
preservation of their specific language and religion led to feelings of increasing alienation
and who were supportive when the communists “played the ethnic card from early on,
with a special stress on minority rights.” 20
The Maoists and their supporters are now composed of various identities that
share that sense of alienation – women, many ethnic and linguistic minorities, the
uneducated. These identities do not remain singular however; the Maoist rebels now
seem to rely on a broader sort of identity. Neither religion nor ethnic heritage comprise
their common bond, and as many rebels are indoctrinated in the movement’s communist
ideology only after they decide (or are forced) to join the ranks, even political philosophy
alone cannot count as the base of the Maoists’ shared identity. Instead, they seem to
draw on the more applicable and broad identity of the excluded, the frustrated, and the
poor. Marie Lecomte-Tilouine wrote in the February 2004 Anthropology Today
The movement offers its members a new ideology which provides a new
understanding of reality for those who have not succeeded educationally or
economically as much as they may have wished: in particular it offers them the
possibility of fighting against their situation, and a new understanding of their
oppression and exploitation. The Maoists have been able to develop a genuine
20

Whelpton, John. A History of Nepal. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 203
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mystique . . . which combines violence and the bonds of brotherhood; this
produces very high degree of cohesion inside the movement and terror outside. 21

Financing a Revolution
New wars are not only created in new ways, they are financed through new
avenues too. Asset transfer – “the redistribution of existing assets so as to favor the
fighting units” 22 – is most applicable to Nepal’s situation. The Maobaadi loot, rob, extort
and pillage in order to gain resources. Globalization-facilitated transnational transfer of
arms is less direct in Nepal than in other new wars, but the rebels arm themselves by
stealing weapons from abandoned or defeated government posts – which, in turn, are
supplied by India. 23 Assistance from diaspora communities living abroad or
transnational networks of similar identities, including the Revolutionary Internationalist
Movement - a worldwide grouping of revolutionary parties committed to the ‘scientific
principles of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought 24 – and Indian Maoist groups
also aid the new wars.
New War Tactics
The PLA, like most new warriors, utilizes a mix between traditional revolutionary
war tactics and traditional counterinsurgency ones. 25 Subscribing to Mao’s principle of
encircling the cities from the countryside, the Maoists have gained much ground in rural
Nepal. The rurally focused type of warfare is wholly characteristic of new wars, and with
the government’s abandonment of the countryside, the Maobaadi have only been unable
to capture the 75 district headquarters and the Kathmandu Valley. However, whereas
21

Cowan, 34
Kaldor, 102.
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traditional revolutionaries would strive to control land by gaining support of the local
population, new war rebels (in Nepal and elsewhere) often choose to win such control by
means of population displacement – ridding the area of all possible opponents. In Nepal
the estimates of internally displaced peoples ranges from 35,000 - 100,000. 26 It is an
ugly tactic and one that borrows from the counterinsurgency idea of “poisoning the
sea.” 27
Additionally, like seemingly all new warriors, Maobaadi (whose focus on the
individual leader Prachanda, use of symbols like the Maoist star, and employment of
child soldiers match the characteristics of new war’s paramilitary groups) depend on
intimidation, extortion, violence, threat of force and brutality to exercise control. 28 The
Maoists “do not, of course, need to secure mass backing to become a powerful force in a
district . . . the threat of violence is enough to ensure the majority’s acquiescence.” 29
And in a situation where globalization rarely makes its benefits apparent, it is logical that
this war, like daily life, would highlight the costs to be avoided as opposed to the benefits
to be gained.
The Second Round: Maoist Tactics and Their Human Rights Implications
According to Puskar Gautam, a former Maoist commander, the Maoist rebellion
evolved as a carbon copy of Mao Tse-Tung’s own war. “The rebels managed to achieve
extensive success by following Mao’s dictates and turning the Nepali terrain to their
advantage.” 30 The PLA was able to claim success because they concentrated their
resources and energy in the rural areas from which they first found their base of support,
26

Adhikari, Bipin Ed. Conflict, Human Rights and Peace: Challenges Before Nepal. Kathmandu: National
Human Rights Commission, 2003. 75.
27
ibid. 98.
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Douglas, 54
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Whelpton, 206
30
Gautam, Puskar. “The Rise and Fall of the Maobaadi” Himal South Asian, ed. Kanak Mani Dixit, MarchApril 2006, 29
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and because they utilized Mao’s strategy of “divide our forces to arouse the masses,
concentrate our forces to deal with the enemy. The enemy advances, we retreat, the
enemy camps, we harass, the enemy tires, we attack, the enemy retreats, we pursue.” 31
Thapa confirms these claims of success, writing,
Before the emergency was imposed and the army called out in November 2001,
the countryside over most of Nepal had been abandoned by the government in
order to concentrate its forces in pockets of defensive formations. Even after the
army mobilisation, apart from ‘search operations’ and regular patrols in a show of
strength that took the security forces to the hinterland, the rural areas remained
more or less in the control of the Maobaadi, whether they were physically present
or not. 32
Gaining control of rural areas by means of brutal tactics became commonplace for the
Maoists.
In addition to their strategic strengths, fighting, battles and attacks in and of
themselves provided some of the drive to continue the fighting, the battles and the
attacks. As Kanak Mani Dixit writes
In the early years, the rebels were able to motivate fighters with their run of
assaults on police and army posts, and the promise of the prize of Kathmandu.
Successful mass attacks on barracks and the looting of weapons also served to
keep up morale. 33
The high level of morale present in the Maoist ranks should not go unmentioned.
Eventually the Royal Nepal Army (RNA) learned to defend in barracks better, helped by
mines and the globalization-facilitated acquisition of Belgian Minimi belt-driven guns
and American M-16s, 34 and “the insurgents had to turn to the ‘lowly’ task of destroying

31

Cowan, 34
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administrative offices, government infrastructure and poorly-armed police chowkis.” 35
Nonetheless, the Maoists continue to show an impressive display of power, and fight as
seriously as they did when they could still hope for Kathmandu.
For example, in March of 2004 the Maoists carried out their largest military
operation, against the western town of Beni - Myagdi District’s headquarters, destroying
all government buildings and taking 40 prisoners (all of whom were later released to the
International Committee of the Red Cross). There were 3800 fighters and 2000 unarmed
Maoist volunteers who arrived near Beni, and even after a twenty day walk all were
capable of advancing the fight by 48 hours when there was suspicion that news of their
plan had been leaked to the army. 36 According to Cowan, a retired British general, the
PLA had impressive security, achieved a impressive level of surprise, and their “medical
support and evacuation arrangements were detailed, and indeed textbook, in both
planning and execution.” 37 He also reports that locals commented on the young age of
the fighters, their agility and commitment, the bravery of wounded, and that 1/3 of the
fighters were women. 38
The Maoists risk great casualties in such attacks, but they demonstrate noteworthy
levels of morale - leadership, discipline, courage, tenacity, endurance and willingness to
sacrifice one’s life. Despite their numerical weakness in the face of the RNA, the PLA
has been able to endure for ten years, and it becomes undeniable that they have plenty of
the qualities and motivations needed to fight. 39

35
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That the Maobaadi have such widespread control only means that their often
violent, brutal, and forceful type of war-making is felt on a wider basis. In rebel
controlled areas, schoolteachers and other government employees are forced to pay a
percentage of their income to the insurgents; families are expected to contribute at least
one member to the Maoist cause; resistors that don’t flee are often abducted and killed –
“sympathizers” of the establishment beheaded. 40 The PLA extorts and intimidates,
tortures those who refuse to shelter and feed them, forces people to join ranks and prefers
using sickles, axes and sticks over guns to kill their enemies. 41 According to the
Secretary General of Amnesty International, Irene Khan, “The Maoists have been
responsible for widespread human rights abuses, including civilian killings, abductions,
and recruitment of child soldiers.” 42 And as the 2006 Report of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights and the Activities of
Her Office, Including Technical Cooperation , in Nepal states
OHCHR-Nepal received information about killings of civilians and members of
security forces who were hors de combat, abductions, other violence and threats
to civilians, including Government officials, teachers, journalists and human
rights defenders. 43

Indeed, the brutality of new war and PLA tactics practically ensure that human rights
abuses will be committed. “Essentially, what were considered to be undesirable and
illegitimate side-effects of old wars have become central to the mode of fighting new
wars.” 44
40
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The Counter-Insurgency
Globalization: Affecting Everything
Not only do globalization’s repercussions create conditions for new wars to
develop, it seems the United States has been able to globalize its new war, the war on
terror. Slightly nervous about the Maoists on their own border (in this age of
globalization and increasingly blurry borders), India was actually the first country to label
the Maoists as terrorists. Reflecting global power dynamics, and the need for support,
Nepal quickly jumped on the US and India bandwagon, now committed to fighting the
war on terror.
Aiding the state of Nepal is the United States military, which set up an elite US
supported fact-action Ranger Battalion. Additionally, Nepal takes advice from the US
Pacific Command, which imposes strategies like unified command - where the antiMaoist activities of the RNA, the civilian Nepal police and the new armed police are
under the same RNA command. 45 More important, however, is that the United States is
teaching the RNA their tactics from Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq, professing that the
best way to measure success in these wars where anybody could be the enemy (or at least
supporting the enemy) is to weaken them, inflict injuries upon them, kill them.
However, the United States has not taken the time to integrate into their
instruction an understanding of the specificities of this war, which means that even if the
utilization of the body count and bloody counter-insurgency tactics from Vietnam,
Afghanistan and Iraq could be called successful in those countries, it may not be so in

45
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Nepal. Especially when you take into consideration that the RNA is “fighting in its own
country, in highly populated territory, against a well-motivated rebel army in
overwhelmingly guerilla-friendly terrain.” 46 Having provided monetary and strategic
aide, this submission to American military instruction is just another manifestation of the
global resources upon which poor Nepal has been forced to rely.
Tactics
“The RNA is fighting a conventional war of attrition, in which the emphasis is on
the control of key territory, and the engagement of the enemy to inflict casualties, thereby
weakening his will to resist “ 47 In this way, the government seems committed to a
solution by arms, although the state maintains its desire for peace talks. As Gen. R. G.
Katawal, the army’s chief of staff stated, “Our aim is to weaken the Maoists so they come
to the negotiating table. They will have to renounce violence, and they won’t do that
until they feel weak enough.” 48 Two peace negotiations failed in 2001 and 2003.
The RNA’s main offensive method for weakening, for inflicting casualties, has
been the use of helicopters, which indiscriminately fire machine guns or throw mortar
bombs. The government has ignored ceasefires in the past in order to continue the killing
of accused Maoists, a move that only incites the rebels. The state’s theory seems to be
that the more terrible, the more brutal, the more continuous their attack, the more likely it
is for the Maoists to surrender. “In a February interview, King Gyanendra explained his
views on the possibilities of winning the current war. ‘It’s not a question of winning or
not winning,’ the king said. ‘It’s a question of taming.’” 49
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The state has been able to inflict many casualties, but tame and weaken the
Maobaadi, the RNA has not. Nor has the state done anything to address the root causes
of the conflict. The RNA has been forced to concentrate its forces in the district
headquarters and Kathmandu Valley. With nearly 100,000 soldiers, “even an additional
doubling of troops to 200,000 . . . would not enable the army to provide permanent
presence across countryside that is ideal for guerrilla warfare.” 50 The Maoists are
stronger than the state gives them credit for, and the RNA is obviously not tactically
strong enough to ‘tame’ the smaller rebels. If they had such strength, ten years surely
should have been long enough.

The Third Round: The State Strikes Again
However, the RNA’s greatest weakness is not its lack of adequate number of
soldiers or tactics, but its lack of concern for the people it is supposed to be protecting,
and its policies of direct violence against those same people. In contradiction to
Vietnam-influenced tactics - as Cowan writes
Military textbooks state that the key to success is gaining the support of the
people, and the way to do this is to treat the people with respect, give them
security, and integrate military efforts with development projects, social programs
and reforms aimed at tackling the underlying sources of discomfort. 51
Instead, the RNA acts with impunity, waging a war on the Maoists that routinely leaks
into the innocent populace. Instead of providing security for the people, the RNA’s use
of helicopters and their indiscriminate and unjustified killing of innocent civilians (under
the guise of suspicion of Maoist involvement) are just as dangerous as the rebels from
whom the RNA is supposed to be protecting the people. Not only is the RNA responsible
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for more civilian deaths than Maoist, the High Commissioner highlights some of the
other ways its violent war violates human rights, stating
Arbitrary arrest, detention and re-arrests of suspected members or sympathizers of
CPN (Maoist) continued to be a major source of concern. The Special Rapporteur
on the question of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment reported that torture is systematically practised in Nepal and
expressed deep concern about the prevailing culture of impunity. Allegations
received by OHCHR-Nepal also indicated that torture is routine. 52
Additionally, the RNA is accused of mandating little accountability for those soldiers
accused of committing human rights violations. Those who are punished usually see very
light punishments. However, since opening in 2005, “the largest category of complaints
received by OHCHR-Nepal has been nearly 300 reports of disappearances of people
arrested on suspicion of being members or sympathizers of CPN (Maoist).” And that is
only since 2005. It is difficult to number exactly how many people have disappeared, but
some estimates are as high as nearly 18,000 since 1996. 53 And according to the National
Human Rights Commission, “more than 1,200 persons remained disappeared since the
beginning of the insurgency.” 54
RNA military strategy is violent by nature, it is easy to see how human rights
violations would flow freely from this mode of action. But it is a violent strategy that is
backed up by Sun Tsu in his 2500 year old book, The Art of War – widely regarded as
one of the best documents written about war. The RNA’s line of attack is “based on the
third best of Sun Tsu’s options. All effort is focused on attacking the PLA - including
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those perceived as giving them succor and support - to inflict the maximum number of
casualties and thus wear them down until their morale collapses.” 55
In the end, Gyanendra’s armed forces are fighting a war in their own country, and
have terrorized their own population to such an extent that the people fear them as much
as the Maoists. The result of this brutal war is that nearly 12,000 people have been killed
and hundreds of thousands have been displaced. “Women have been attacked and raped.
Farmers walking home from their fields face bombs and ambushes. . . A population
already living in dire poverty has been further impoverished by conflict.” 56
The pervasive human rights violations are not only morally condemnable they are
a tactical mistake. Because “ultimately, the Maoists do not need the support of the people
to stop effective governance in rural areas. All they need is for the people not actively to
support the state. It is the state that needs the people’s support.” 57 And with the Nepal
becoming “a militarized state where military officers have sidelined the civilian
administrators and police through the 75 districts” 58 and the RNA acts as defacto
administrators, the people lose support for them, as their army and as their government,
when their carry out their own assaults and fail to provide adequate protection.

Not the Only War
Legacy of repression
The state may not have lost a large base of support through its tactics fighting the
Maoists and repressive attitude because such a base may have never truly existed. The
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Nepali people have only seen democracy once before, when its success was hampered by
the corruption and power-grabbing of the political parties. The rest of Nepal’s history of
rule is more openly repressive. For example, the state made few efforts at providing an
education for the people, and those few were late and limited. The first attempt at
curriculum development and formalization of education only took place in the early
1950s by aid of USAID. 59 The country has a legacy of censoring journalists, harassing
the intelligentsia and those activists working for democracy, a tradition it continues to
this day.
The Nepali people’s first real attempt to counter the oppressive forces at work in
the palace came in 1990, when on April 6 the streets of Kathmandu filled with people, a
disputable number of whom were shot and killed that afternoon when they attempted
climb a statue. 60 On April 9 the political parties were again allowed to operate, after a
ban of 30 years. Nepal’s experiment with democracy was cut short in 2001 when the
supposedly drunk and deranged crown prince Dipendra shot and killed 11 members of
the royal family, then shot himself. Conspiracy theories abound about the involvement of
the army or of the now king Gyanendra and his oldest son, Paras. Regardless, when
Dipendra died after a few days in a coma, Gyanendra was crowned king. He has ruled
with an authoritarian hand, using the Maoist insurgency as an excuse to declare a state of
emergency in 2005 and allowing state-sponsored human rights violations to increase.
The Fourth Round: Gyanendra’s Second War
The Maoist war ravaging the country is only made worse by the existence of King
Gyanendra’s second war, the one he wages on political activists, journalists and all
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progressives. During the state of emergency, “many fundamental rights were suspended
and hundreds of political leaders and activists, human rights defenders, journalists and
others were imprisoned.” 61 Recently, according to the High Commissioner
Blanket bans on demonstrations were imposed in many municipalities as a means
to prevent the exercise of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly . . . Media
Ordinance entrenched Government efforts to ban the broadcasting of news on FM
radio stations and other restrictions on freedom of expression. In rural districts
there was a consistent pattern of threats and harassment of journalists by
authorities. 62

Increasingly violent reactions to these bans, and to the arbitrary arrest and detention of
political activists and leaders, are often met with excessive force from the RNA and the
police. Such was the case in April of 2006 during the protests of the second people’s
movement.
But it only recently became less dangerous to have thoughts in Nepal, to have
active political motivations. Nepalis have seen their freedom stolen “in the last three
years by a newly crowned king-turned-despot, who shows contempt for the people at
every turn and speaks in Orwellian doublespeak of democracy and constitutionalism
while proceeding to demolish both.” 63
Numerous challenges to the RNA about their questionable human rights
observance have only been met with calls to judge the Maoists as well. “This willingness
to be judged at the same level as the renegade insurgents speaks of the quality of
leadership with which the RNA is saddled – the same leadership that accepted Chairman
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Gyanendra’s call to arms, not to fight the Maoists in the jungles, but to battle politicians,
lawyers, journalists and human rights activists.” 64

Democracy and the Maoists: Two Social Movements
The universal misalignment of power and interests seems to inevitably structure
societies in ways that create a significant number of people who are find their interests
unmet but lack the immediate power necessary to change that situation. It is the
formation of oppositional consciousness, the mental state required to incite an oppressed
group to overthrow or reform a system of human domination, that is required in order to
start and sustain a social movement aimed at eliminating that oppression. As Mansbridge
defines it, the formation of oppositional consciousness requires that one recognize that a
group is different from another group; that one is a member of this group and that it is not
a shameful fact; that the differences create detrimental inequality; that this inequality is
unjust; that there is a shared interest in ending those injustices; that collective action can
play a part in halting that injustice; and that collective action can actually succeed in
terminating (or at least reducing) the injustices. 65 Though their tactics differ, both the
movement for democracy and the Maoist rebellion utilize this oppositional consciousness
in their movements for social change, movements which the disadvantaged use in
attempts to realign power relationships.
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The People’s Movement
The people’s movement of 1990, its second incarnation in 2006, and continuous
activism of journalists and human rights workers in the interim are social movements of
the traditional sort. If we accept Lukas’ explanation of power as existing in three
dimensions, where the oppressors not only have direct control of the powerless in the
decision making realm (first dimension), but also exclude certain participants and issues
(second dimension), and at the same time also exercise complete enough power to censor
the demands and shape the desires of the powerless (third dimension);66 then the
democracy activists can be seen as having broken down that covert third dimension of
power in the hopes of rectifying the first two. And they have continued in the face of
more overt repression. The activists have been forced to operate as a social movement in
the realm of extraordinary politics – outside the normal channels of politics - in order to
even garner a chance to operate within those more normal domains.

The People’s War
The Maobaadi’s armed revolt diverges from the more traditional types of social
movements that utilize protests and demonstrations, but it possesses as much oppositional
consciousness and awareness and as many political motivations as the democracy
movement. Additionally, this conflict is most definitely an attempted solution to what
were viewed as political and social problems. The arms used in rebellions of this sort are
unfortunate, but conflict, in and of itself, is not entirely negative. In fact, conflict is often
a reaction to perceived societal ills and a method for demanding change. It was arguably
the political specificities of Nepal’s government that frustrated the Maoists to the extent
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they felt compelled to turn their methods violent, to begin acting outside the normal
channels of politics. Indeed radical politics often require radical tactics – the apparent
necessity of arms is something to be mourned, but it is also understandable.
The People’s Liberation Army obviously believes the political and social reforms
they demand are causes worthy of armed revolt. “Wars can be just and unjust – and one
can term all Maoist ‘people’s wars’ as just wars, the same as national liberation
movements.” 67 However, despite their progressive demands, the Maoists, just like the
RNA, seem to discount the supreme importance of the people. “It becomes a matter of
concern whether the rebellion puts the gun or the people at the forefront of its strategy.
The Maobaadi forgot Mao’s dictum that while guns are important, it is the people that are
decisive. Instead, the Maobaadi put the gun before the people, militarism before
politics.” 68 The truth of this statement is evidenced by the fact that it was the ‘peaceful’
social movement for democracy this past April that had more liberal success in a matter
of weeks than the Maobaadi have had in the past decade.

Human Rights in Conflict
That Nepal is committing a wide range of human rights abuses is sad enough, but
that two social movements provide the fodder for such abuses is even less encouraging.
But it is intriguing. Why are these two conflicts providing so many opportunities for the
violations of human rights? How is it that the realities of these social movements can
stand in such contradiction to their stated goals, can cause so much bloodshed in the wake
of their attempted progressiveness?
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An Especially Brutal King
Autocratic states, by their nature, create a space for their ideological counterparts,
who usually adopt as extreme a position as the conservative state. Conflict itself arises
out of the ideological clash between these extremes. And the autocratic ruler, who, by his
nature, resists change, staunchly resists the desires for change that the conflict manifests.
King Gyanendra is unquestionably an autocratic ruler; in May 2002 he dissolved the
House of Representatives, cancelled elections to local government bodies and dismissed
the prime minister soon thereafter. But Gyanendra reached his peak in February 2005
when he claimed all executive power, declared a state of emergency, shut off the
country’s telephone, radio and internet services, imposed harsh press censorship and
arrested political leaders.
The repressive nature of Gyanendra’s rule explains how the destruction of the
monarchy’s image is not the Maoists’ doing, but the chairman’s own. 69 It is the despotic
nature of the king’s rule that incites progressive challenges (both democratic and armed)
to his power; and it is his oppressive and vicious rule that makes the violent nature of his
responses somewhat unsurprising, and practically guarantees human rights violations.
But neither the bruised ego of a brutal king nor the seemingly inevitable violent
suppression of liberal activities alone can explain why human rights violations have
become so rampant in Nepal.
A Clash of Tactics
The PLA and the RNA are fighting two different wars. Understanding the tactical
misalignment between the two warring parties goes a long way to explain the status of
human rights in Nepal. To begin with, that the army has practically abandoned the
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countryside only allows the Maobaadi’s habitually terrorizing and abusive warfare to
spread and sustain itself, and to injure the populace. Additionally, such desertion, as
already discussed, rouses state resentment in a people surrounded by a rebellion that
offers an outlet for anger and promises an escape from the realm of the ignored, therefore
aiding the Maoists in their recruitment. The Maoists are notorious for their high level of
extortion, garnering food and shelter from civilians - frequently under the threat of
violence - which means that when the RNA does arrive, its soldiers inflict severe civilian
casualties, adhering to their policy of eliminating Maoist supporters but refusing to see
the nuances existent in this particular war. Globalization is creating international systems
of support and a terrorist-fighting morale to the RNA, while contributing to the inherently
brutal actions of warriors in new wars, who fight from the desperate position in which
globalization has put them. The RNA and the PLA tactics meet in ways that reinforce
their individual ways of fighting, reinforce the conflict by encouraging some popular
sensitivity for the Maoists’ agenda, and form pockets in which civilian deaths are
guaranteed. In addition to the human rights violations carried out as military routine on
both sides, it seems that the interaction between the RNA and the Maoists’ differing
modes of warfare prolongs the war itself and creates supplementary circumstances
conducive to human rights violations.
A Cyclical Relationship
On a certain level the human rights violations are propagating themselves. In
terms of the democracy movement, the violations committed against activists serve as
evidence to those protesters that their fight needs to continue, which means the state
always has someone’s human rights to abuse. The initial structural and institutional
human rights violations are partly responsible for a Maoist conflict that, by virtue of a
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brutal king and a disastrous jarring between the already violent tactics of the RNA and
the Maobaadi, is rife with violations. And in the end, those very human rights violations
provide motivation for the warring parties to continue fighting just as ferociously.
Essentially, “new wars create a cycle in which war itself creates legitimization for the
criminal activities that further propagate the war. The warring parties need more or less
permanent conflict to reproduce their positions of power.” 70 So for ten years the Maoists
have battled in the countryside, the extent of their control helping compose their
legitimacy. And the state fought back, its terror and show of superior force its power
against the Maoists in a war that is used to legitimize the authoritarian rule over the
populace.

Hope for Change?
For the first time in ten years, however, the Maoist seem to be implying that they
are ready to abandon conflict as their base of legitimacy, and perhaps make a return to
mainstream politics. In contrast to the 1991 plenum that first integrated Prachanda’s call
for revolution, the Maoists held another plenum in August 2005, where they unanimously
passed a resolution that maintained “the rebels would take a 180-degree turn (not
announced as such), turn their ideology on its head, and enter ‘competitive multiparty
politics.’” 71
Although the Maoists have admitted the unlikelihood of ever militarily defeating
the RNA, it is not only the RNA’s superiority that is encouraging the Maoists to consider
a return to mainstream politics. Regional geopolitics and the US and Indian support of
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RNA also contributed to the turnaround. Perhaps most important however, is the fact that
few other governments would recognize Maoists, as Maoists, in a seat of government.
Indeed, “it is a requirement of their very success that they abandon the ‘people’s war’ that
has brought them thus far.” 72
And so, the 12-point agreement the Maoists signed with the seven party alliance
only encouraged the peaceful engagement with the government after the second jana
andolan (people’s movement) in the spring of 2006. After more than a week of violent
protests, peaceful protests, curfews and shoot to kill orders, Nepal had again seen a
democratic victory when Gyanendra gave in to some significant demands. He reinstated
Parliament on April 26 and Nepal now has a government that established a three-month
ceasefire with the Maoists and is engaging them in peace negotiations. The United States
is even considering removing the terrorist tag for the Maoists. 73 Whether this round of
democracy is as impermanent as the first round remains to be seen, but there may be hope
for something different happening this time. The people’s seizure of power seems to
have come at a time when it could fix the exclusionary mistake of the 90’s democracy by
providing a forum in which the Maoists could nonviolently address their concerns. This
round of democracy is significant because it is one that holds the possibility of Nepal
leaving limbo: a round that can either sentence Nepal to more turmoil with its possible
ineffectuality, or one that can potentially halt the four rounds of human rights abuses that
brought Nepal to this point.
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